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ABSTRACT 
Nanoscientific research has been characterized as an “engineering way of being in science.” This 
mode of research calls for a philosophy of technoscience that investigates the four questions: i) 
What is the role of theory and theory-development in nanoscale research, and what kinds of theories 
are needed for nanotechnological development? ii) What are the preferred methods and tools and 
the associated modes of reasoning in nanoscientific research? iii) What is nanotechnoscience and 
how are its objects constituted? iv) What kind of knowledge do technoscientific researchers 
typically produce and communicate? The consideration of these questions yields a survey of 
nanotechnoscience in terms of disciplinary questions (a complex field partially disclosed by 
stretching closed theories), of methodology (constructions and qualitative judgments of likeness), of 
ontology (a thin conception of nature as unlimited potential), and of epistemology (acquisition and 
demonstration of capabilities). In all four cases, the strictly philosophical discussion leads to 
societal dimensions and questions of value. 
I.  INTRODUCTION: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND OF TECHNOSCIENCE 
One way or another, the philosophy of science and nature always informs and reflects the 
development of science and technology. It appears in the midst of disputes over theories and 
methods, in the reflective thought of scientists, and since the late 19th century also in the analyses of 
so-called philosophers of science. Four philosophical questions, in particular, are answered 
implicitly or contested explicitly by any scientific endeavor: 
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1. How is a particular science to be defined and what are the objects and problems in its domain 
of interest? 
2. What is the methodologically proper or specifically scientific way of approaching these 
objects and problems? What kind of knowledge is produced and communicated, how does it 
attain objectivity, if not certainty, and how does it balance the competing demands of 
universal generality and local specificity? 
3. What is its place in relation to other sciences, where do its instruments and methods, its 
concepts and theories come from, and should its findings be explained on a deeper level by 
more fundamental investigations? 
When researchers publish their results, review and critique their peers, argue for research funds, or 
train graduate students, they offer examples of what they consider good scientific practice and 
thereby adopt a stance on all four questions. When, for example, there is a call for more basic 
research on some scientific question, one can look at the argument that is advanced and discover 
how it is informed by a particular conception of science and the relation of science and technology. 
Frequently it involves the idea that basic science identifies rather general laws of causal relations. 
These laws can then be applied in a variety of contexts and the deliberate control of causes and 
effects can give rise to new technical devices. If one encounters such an argument for basic science, 
one might ask, of course, whether this picture of basic versus applied science is accurate. While it 
may hold here and there especially in theoretical physics, it is perhaps altogether inadequate for 
chemistry. And thus one may find that the implicit assumptions agree less with the practice and 
history of science, and more with a particular self-understanding of science. According to this self-
understanding, basic science disinterestedly studies the world as it is, whereas the engineering 
sciences apply this knowledge to change the world in accordance to human purposes. 
 Science and scientific practice are always changing as new instruments are invented, new 
problems arise, new disciplines emerge. Also, the somewhat idealized self-understandings of 
scientists can change. The relation of science and technology provides a case point. Is molecular 
electronics a basic science? Is nanotechnology applied nanoscience? Are the optical properties of 
carbon nanotubes part of the world as it is, or do they appear only in the midst of a large-scale 
engineering pursuit that is changing the world according to human purposes? There are no easy or 
straightforward answers to these questions, and this is perhaps due to the fact that the traditional 
ways of distinguishing science and technology, basic and applied research do not work any longer. 
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As many authors are suggesting, we should speak of “technoscience” [1,2] which is defined 
primarily by the interdependence of theoretical observation and technical intervention [3].  1
Accordingly, the designation “nanotechno-science” is more than shorthand for “nanoscience and 
nanotechnologies” but signifies a mode of research other than traditional science and engineering. 
Peter Galison, for example, notes that “[n]anoscientists aim to build – not to demonstrate existence. 
They are after an engineering way of being in science.”[5] Others appeal to the idea of a “general 
purpose technology” and thus suggest that nanotechnoscience is fundamental research to enable a 
new technological development at large. Richard Jones sharpens this when he succinctly labels at 
least some nanotechnoscientific research as “basic gizmology.”  2
 Often, nanoscience is defined as an investigation of scale-dependently discontinuous properties 
or phenomena.[6] This definition of nanoscience produces in its wake an ill-defined conception of 
nanotechnologies – these encompass all possible technical uses of these properties and phenomena. 
In its 2004 report on nanoscience and nanotechnologies, the Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering defines these terms as follows: 
 Nanoscience is the study of phenomena and manipulation of materials at atomic, molecular and 
macromolecular scales, where properties differ significantly from those at a larger scale. 
Nanotechnologies are the design, characterisation, production and application of structures, 
devices and systems by controlling shape and size at the nanometre scale.[7] 
The notion of “nanotechnoscience” does not contradict such definitions but assumes a different 
perspective – it looks from within the organization of research where fundamental capabilities are 
typically acquired in the context of funded projects with a more or less concretely imagined 
technical goal. This is what Galison means by an engineering way of being in science. Even though 
a great deal of scientific knowledge and experience goes into the acquisition of such capabilities 
and the investigation of novel phenomena, it is not quite “science” because the point of this 
investigation is not normally to question received conceptions and to establish new truths, nor is it 
 This is in reference to Ian Hacking's distinction of "representing" and "intervening" [4]: In technoscientific 1
research, the business of theoretical representation cannot be dissociated, even in principle, from the 
material conditions of knowledge production and thus from the interventions that are required to make and 
stabilize the phenomena. In other words, technoscience knows only one way of gaining new knowledge and 
that is by first making a new world. If the business of science is the theoretical representation of an eternal 
and immutably given nature, and if the business of technology is to control the world, to intervene and 
change the "natural" course of events, "technoscience" is a hybrid where theoretical representation becomes 
entangled with technical intervention.
 Jones used this term in conversation (and on his website www.softmachines.org) and referred for example 2
to Nadrian Seeman’s systematic exploration of DNA as a building block or component of future technical 
systems. 
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to produce conjectures and then try to falsify them, or to develop theories that close important gaps 
in our understanding of the world. And even though nanoscale research practice involves a good bit 
of tinkering and pursues technological challenges and promises, it is also not “engineering” because 
most researchers are not in the business of building devices for more or less immediate use. At best, 
they lay the groundwork for concrete engineering projects in the future. 
 For this “engineering way of being in science” a philosophy of technoscience is needed that asks 
for nanotechnological, biomedical, or semi-conductor research the four questions that were 
identified above: What is the role of theory and theory-development in nanoscale research, and 
what kinds of theories are needed for nanotechnological development? What are the preferred 
methods and tools and the associated modes of reasoning in nanoscientific research? What is 
nanotechnoscience and how are its objects constituted? What kind of knowledge do technoscientific 
researchers typically produce and communicate? The four main sections of this chapter will tend to 
these questions – and in all four cases, strictly philosophical considerations will shade into societal 
dimensions and questions of value. That this is so is due to the fact that there may have been “pure 
science” but that there is no such thing as “pure technoscience.” Indeed, one way of characterizing 
technoscience is by noting that academic laboratory research is answerable no longer just to 
standards of peer researchers but that it has entered the “ethical space” of engineering with its 
accountability also to patrons and clients, to developers and users [8,9].  
II.  FROM “CLOSED THEORIES” TO LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROL 
(1) Closed Relative to the Nanoscale  
In the late 1940s, physicist Werner Heisenberg introduced the notion of “closed theories.” In 
particular, he referred to four closed theories: “Newtonian mechanics, Maxwell’s theory with the 
special theory of relativity, thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, non-relativistic quantum-
mechanics with atomic physics and chemistry.” These theories he considered to be closed in four 
complementary respects: 
1. Their historical development has come to an end, they are finished or reached their 
final form. 
2. They constitute a hermetically closed domain in that the theory defines conditions of 
applicability such that the theory will be true wherever its concepts can be applied. 
3. They are immune to criticism; problems that arise in contexts of application are 
deflected to auxiliary theories and hypotheses or to the specifics of the set-up, the 
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instrumentation, etc. 
4. They are forever valid: wherever and whenever experience can be described with the 
concepts of such a theory, the laws postulated by this theory will be proven correct.[10]  3
All this holds for nanotechnoscience: It draws on an available repertoire of theories that are closed 
or considered closed in respect to the nanoscale but it is concerned neither with the critique or 
further elaboration of these theories, nor with the construction of theories of its own.  This is not to 4
say, however, that closed theories are simply “applied” in nanotechnoscience. 
When Heisenberg refers to the hermetically closed character of closed theories (in condition 2 
above), he states merely that the theory will be true where its concepts can be applied and leaves 
quite open how big or small the domain of its actual applicability is. Indeed, he suggests that this 
domain is so small that a “closed theory does not contain any absolutely certain statement about the 
world of experience” [10]. Even for a closed theory, then, it remains to be determined how and to 
what extent its concepts can be applied to the world of experience.  Thus, there is no preexisting 5
domain of phenomena to which a closed theory is applied. Instead, it is “a question of success,”, 
that is, of calibration, tuning, or mutual adjustment to what extent phenomena of experience can be 
assimilated to the theory such that its concepts can be applied to them. 
(2) Applying Theory to the Nanoscale: Fitting vs. Stretching 
This notion of “application” has been the topic of many recent discussions on modelling  – but it 6
does not capture the case of nanotechnoscience. For in this case, researchers are not trying to bring 
nanoscale phenomena into the domain of quantum chemistry or fluid dynamics or the like. They are 
 Heisenberg’s notion of closed theories influenced Thomas Kuhn’s conception of a paradigm [11]. It also 3
informed the so-called finalization thesis, one of the first systematic accounts of technoscience [12]. 
Heisenberg also emphasized a fifth and especially contentious aspect of closed theories: An expansion of 
their domain of application will not introduce a change to the theory. This aspect and Heisenberg’s particular 
list of closed theories plays no part in the following discussion.
 In the case of nanotechnoscience, this repertoire includes far more than the four theories singled out by 4
Heisenberg. It is a bold claim, to be sure, that nanotechnoscience is not concerned with the construction of 
theories of its own. One counterexample might be the discovery and subsequent theoretical work on the giant 
magnetoresistance effect [13]. Also, there are certain isolated voices who call for the development of theory 
specifically suited to the complexities of the nanocosm [14,15]. These voices are isolated, indeed, and the 
consensus appears to be that the development of nanotechnologies can do without such theories – which 
might be hard to come by anyway [16].
 Here, Heisenberg might have been inspired by Heinrich Hertz who formulated the Principles of Mechanics 5
as a closed theory [17]. He defined as mechanical problems all those phenomena of motion that can be 
accounted for by his fundamental law, albeit with the help of additional assumptions. Phenomena that cannot 
be accounted for in such a way, are not mechanical problems and simply outside the domain of mechanics 
(for example, the problems of life).
 See the work, in particular, of Nancy Cartwright, Margaret Morrison, and Mary Morgan [18,19].6
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not using models to extend the domain of application of a closed theory or general law. They are not 
engaged in fitting the theory to reality and vice versa. Instead, they take nanoscale phenomena as 
parts of a highly complex mesocosm between classical and quantum regimes. They have no theories 
that are especially suited to account for this complexity, no theories, for example, of structure-
property relations at the nanoscale.  Nanoscale researchers understand, in particular, that the various 7
closed theories have been formulated for far better-behaved phenomena in far more easily 
controlled laboratory settings. Rather than claim that the complex phenomena of the nanoscale can 
be described such that the concepts of the closed theory now apply to them, they draw on closed 
theories eclectically, stretching them beyond their intended scope of application to do some partial 
explanatory work at the nanoscale.  A certain measurement of a current through an organic-8
inorganic molecular complex, for example, might be reconstructed quantum-chemically or in the 
classical terms of electrical engineering – and yet, the two accounts do not compete against each 
other for offering a better or best explanation [20].  Armed with theories that are closed relative to 
the nanoscale, researchers are well equipped to handle phenomena in need of explanation, but they 
are also aware that they bring crude instruments that are not made specifically for the task and that 
these instruments therefore have to work in concert. Indeed, nanoscale research is characterized by 
a tacit consensus according to which the following three propositions are to hold true 
simultaneously: 
1. There is a fundamental difference between quantum and classical regimes such that classical 
theories cannot describe quantum phenomena and such that quantum theories are inappropriate 
for describing classical phenomena. 
2. The nanoscale holds intellectual and technical interest because it is an “exotic territory” [14] 
 Note that the term “complexity” is used here in a deliberately non-technical manner. It does not refer to 7
phenomena that fit the constraints of non-linear complex dynamics, “complexity-theory,” or the like. The 
complexity at the nanoscale is one of great messiness, too many relevant variables and properties, and 
multiple complicated interactions. This becomes apparent especially in contrast to the comparatively neat 
world of the laboratory phenomena that underwrite classical and quantum physics. In its complexity, the 
“real-world situation” of the nanoworld is precariously situated between classical and quantum regimes.
 Here is another way to characterize this contrast between “applying” theory by fitting and by stretching: In 8
the standard case of fitting theory to reality and vice versa, the problem concerns ways to compensate for the 
idealizations or abstractions that are involved in formulating a theory and constructing a model. However, 
classical theories do not abstract from nanoscale properties and processes, nor do they refer to idealizations 
of nanoscale phenomena. In this case, the challenge is that of crossing from the intended domain of a 
classical theory into quite another domain. – Like all attempts to systematically distinguish the new 
nanotechnoscience from old-fashioned “science and engineering,” this one is vulnerable to the critique that 
the two notions of “application” (bringing phenomena into the domain of application, stretching the domain 
of application to areas for which the theory has not been made) are not categorically distinct but differ only 
by degree. I would like to thank Eric Winsberg for suggesting this line of thought.
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where classical properties like color and conductivity emerge when one moves up from quantum 
levels, and where phenomena like quantized conductance emerge as one moves down to the 
quantum regime. 
3. Nanoscale researchers can eclectically draw upon a large toolkit of theories from the quantum 
and classical regimes to construct explanations of novel properties, behaviors, or processes. 
Taken together, these three statements express a characteristic tension concerning nanotechnology, 
namely that it is thought to be strange, novel, and surprising on the one hand, familiar and 
manageable on the other. More significantly for present purposes, however, they express an 
analogous tension regarding available theories: They are thought to be inadequate on the one hand 
but quite sufficient on the other. The profound difference between classical and quantum regimes 
highlights what makes the nanocosm special and interesting – but this difference melts down to a 
matter of expediency and taste when it comes to choosing tools from classical or quantum physics. 
Put yet another way: What makes nanoscale phenomena scientifically interesting is that they cannot 
be adequately described from either perspective, but what makes nanotechnologies possible is that 
the two perspectives make do when it comes to account for these phenomena.  
 Available theories need to be stretched in order to manage the tension between these three 
propositions. How this stretching actually takes place in research practice needs to be shown with 
the help of detailed case studies. One might look, for example, at the way in which theory is 
occasionally “stuck in” to satisfy an extraneous explanatory demand.  A more prominent case is the 9
construction of simulation models where integrations of different levels of theoretical description 
are tuned to the actual behavior of a nanoscale system or process [22,23]. This implies also that the 
very meaning of theories is stretched especially where they account for causal structure behind the 
observed phenomena: As these theories are applied in situations that are taken to be far more 
complex than the one for which the theories were developed, the causal story offered by them takes 
a backseat to the contributions they can make towards a description of the phenomena. In other 
words, algorithms descriptive of a certain dynamics become detached from the causal explanation 
they originally helped to provide, since it is the initial or structural conditions precisely that are not 
 See, for example, a publication in Science on observed effects (large on-off ratios, negative differential 9
resistance) in a molecular device. Asked by peer reviewers to offer an explanation of the observed effect, the 
authors suggest a somewhat arbitrary but plausible candidate mechanism and call for theories and future 
experimental work to “elucidate the transport mechanisms” [21]. This discussion was introduced reluctantly 
since it is clearly unnecessary for the point they wish to make (namely that they can consistently pass a 
current where no one had done so before), and because it is obviously easy to come up with a sufficiently 
credible explanation from the toolkit of available theory. The authors implicitly acknowledge that another 
explanation could easily substitute for theirs.
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thought to hold continuously from macro to nano to quantum regimes.   10
 There is quite another symptom of the ways in which theories and concepts are stretched as they 
are applied to the nanoscale. The nanoworld is taken to be complex, self-organizing, full of 
surprises – a world characterized by chemical and biological activity. The aspirations of 
nanotechnologies therefore emphasize the construction of active rather than merely passive 
devices.  The so-called first generation of nanotechnological achievements was limited to the 11
generation of new materials (passive structures), the second generation is supposed to incorporate 
molecular activity into nanotechnical systems.  However, from the point of view of theories that 12
are closed relative to the nanoscale, one cannot “see” any of that novel activity and liveliness but 
only what has become stabilized in the formulations and formalisms of those theories. Several 
descriptive or programmatic terms for nanoscale phenomena therefore strain to reach beyond their 
actual meanings. A prime example of this is the term “selective surface” which attributes agency to 
something that remains quite passive: Cells may attach to a given surface differentially, but the 
surface is not therefore doing anything to favor or disfavor certain cells; the selection is entirely on 
the side of the engineer who selects that surface in order to achieve some functionality. The same 
holds for “self-cleaning surfaces,” “smart materials,” “autonomous (self-propelled) movement,” the 
different conceptions of “self-assembly,” or “soft machines.”  All these terms have a specific 13
meaning and at the same time refer to something more visionary, more genuinely “nano” that 
transcends their pedigree in theories that come from outside the nanoworld.  14
 At the panel “Ontologies of Technoscience” of the  October 2006 Bielefeld conference (“Science in the 10
Context of Application”), Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent showed that in the development of materials science 
and nanotechnologies the focus on structure-function relations (Crick’s dogma that scientific understanding 
requires that function is referred to underlying structure) gives way to analyses of dynamic patterns in the 
observed functions and properties. Davis Baird offered as an example of this a particular nanotechnological 
detection device that physically instantiates factor analysis and therefore statistically infers underlying causes 
from observed properties (in other words, it does not perform a physical or chemical analysis to identify the 
presence of what is measured). Nicole Karafyllis finally suggested that (nano)technologies are now entering 
into a novel relation to biology as they design function not through construction (e.g. from structural 
principles) but by way of growth (e.g. by way of harnessing of self-organization).
 Regarding the prestige of the device vis-a-vis the material, see Nordmann 2005 and forthcoming on 11
Herbert Gleiter as a pioneer of nanotechnology.
 The trope of first/second generation passive/active devices was established and reproduced especially by 12
Mihail Roco of the National Nanotechnology Initiative. This paper remains quite agnostic as to whether the 
second generation will ever be attained.
 Since the publication of Richard Jones’s book on Soft Machines, that concept has been subject of an 13
emerging discussion [25, 26]. It concerns the question whether the term “machine” retains any meaning in 
the notion of a “soft machine” when this is thought of as a non-mechanical, biological machine (while it 
clearly does retain meaning if thought of as a “concrete” machine in the sense of Simondon).
 This is especially true, perhaps, for the concept “self-assembly,” which has been cautiously delimited for 14
example by George Whitesides [27] but which keeps escaping the box and harks backwards and forwards to 
far more ambitious notions of order out of chaos, spontaneous configurations at higher levels, etc.
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(3) Mute Complexity 
So far, the notion of stretching what we know in one regime to phenomena in another one, has been 
taken descriptively to characterize nanoscale research. Here, however, arises an occasion for critical 
questioning by scientists, citizens, concerned policy makers. To the extent that one cannot see the 
specific complexity from the point of view of theories closed relative to the nanoscale, we may find 
that the difficulties of understanding and controlling nanoscale phenomena are not adequately 
expressed. By stretching closed theories one recovers partial explanations of phenomena and 
thereby partial stories only of success. In other words, the assurance that much is amenable to 
explanation from the large toolkit of available theories finds ample expression, but there is no 
theoretical framework for the actual struggle of taming and controlling nanoscale phenomena – this 
part of the story remains untold, locked up in the laboratory.  Put bluntly, one might be doing years 15
and years of interesting research only to discover that most of the phenomena one is tinkering with, 
that one is stabilizing and probing in the laboratory, will never be robust enough to serve as 
components in nanotechnological devices. There is no language, in other words, to identify specific 
limits of knowledge and control. 
 Having arrived at this point in a rather roundabout manner, one might ask whether the limited 
ways to speak of limits of understanding and control can be shown more straightforwardly. A telling 
illustration or example is provided by nanotoxicology. It is finding out the hard way that physico-
chemical characterization does not go very far, that even the best methods for evaluating chemical 
substances do not REACh all the way to the nanoscale [28].  In other words, the methods of 16
chemical toxicology go only so far, will be able to tell only a small part of the toxicological story – 
though regarding chemical composition, at least, there are general principles, even laws that can be 
drawn upon. In regard to the surface characteristics and shape of particles of a certain size, one has 
to rely mostly on anecdotes from very different contexts, like the story of asbestos. For lack of 
better approaches, therefore, one begins from the vantage point of chemical toxicology and 
 To be sure, it is a commonplace that laboratory practice is more complex than the stories told in scientific 15
papers. Traditional scientific research often seeks to isolate particular causal relations by shielding them 
against interferences from the complex macroscopic world of the laboratory. Whether it is easy or difficult to 
isolate these relations, whether they are stable or evanescent is of little importance for the scientific stories to 
be told. The situation changes in respect to nanotechnoscience: Its mission is to ground future technologies 
under conditions of complexity. In this situation, it becomes significant that scientific publications tell stories 
only of success.
 The pun is intended: REACh refers to the new style of regulating chemical substances in and by the EU. It 16
is widely acknowledged that it does not apply where properties depend not only on chemical composition but 
also on surface characteristics, size, shape, perhaps also engineered functionality and the specificities of their 
environments. (Along similar lines, Joachim Schummer [29] has argued that REACh does not even reach to 
the products of conventional synthetic chemistry.) 
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confidently stretches available theories and methods as far as they will go – while the complexities 
of hazard identification, let alone risk assessment (one partially characterized nanoparticle or 
nanosystem at a time?!) tend to be muted.  17
  There is yet another, again more general way to make this point. Theories that are closed relative 
to the nanoscale can only introduce non-specific constraints. The prospects and aspirations of 
nanotechnologies are only negatively defined: Everything is thought to be possible at the nanoscale 
that is not ruled out by those closed theories or the known laws of nature. This, however, forces 
upon us a notion of technical possibility that is hardly more substantial than that of logical 
possibility. Clearly, the mere fact that something does not contradict known laws is not sufficient to 
establish that it can be realized technically under the complex conditions of the nanoregime. Yet 
once again, there is no theoretical framework or language available to make a distinction here and 
to acknowledge the specificities and difficulties of the nanoworld – since all we have are theories 
that were developed elsewhere and that are now stretched to accommodate phenomena from the 
nanosphere.  However, failure to develop an understanding also of limits of understanding and 18
control at the nanoscale has tremendous cost as it misdirects expectations, public debate, and 
possibly also research funding.  
III.  FROM SUCCESSFUL METHODS TO THE POWER OF IMAGES 
(1) (Techno)Scientific Methodology: Quantitative vs. Qualitative 
As was shown above, Heisenberg considered “a question of success” the extent to which 
phenomena of experience can be fitted to closed theories [10]. This suggests the question what 
“success” amounts to in nanoscale research, that is, what it takes to satisfy oneself that one has 
reached a sufficiently good understanding or control of the phenomena under investigation. 
 For Heisenberg and any philosopher of science who is oriented towards theoretical physics, this 
question boils down to the predictive success of a quantitative science. Here, “quantitative” means 
more than the employment of numbers and even of precision measurements. The characteristics of 
quantitative approaches include the following: First, predicted numerical values are compared to 
 Sabine Maasen and Monika Kurath have shown that this difficulty for chemical toxicology creates 17
interesting new opportunities for nanotoxicology [31]. – For another illustration of the predicament, one 
might recall that carbon nanotubes were “discovered” in the 1980s, that for a good number of years they are 
being commercially manufactured, and that researchers are still complaining that no two batches are alike.
 I have been urging that more attention be paid to limits of understanding and control at the nanoscale. If I 18
am right in this section, I have been asking for something that cannot be done (as of now) in a 
straightforward way.
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values obtained by measurement. The reasonably close agreement between two numbers thus serves 
to establish the agreement of theory and reality. Second, this quantitative agreement emphatically 
makes do without any appeal to a likeness or similarity between theoretical models and the real-
world systems they are said to represent. Quantitative science rests content if it reliably leads from 
initial conditions to accurate predictions, it does not require that all the details of its conceptual 
apparatus (every term in its algorithms) has a counterpart in reality. Both characteristics of 
quantitative science are familiar especially from 20th century theoretical physics – but do they serve 
to characterize also nanotechnoscience [31]? 
 In light of the extremely heterogeneous research practices under the general heading of 
“nanoscience and nanotechnologies” there may not be a general answer to this question. Yet it is fair 
to say that much nanotechnoscientific research is qualitative. Its epistemic success consists in 
constructions of likeness.  19
 The shift sounds innocent enough but may have significant consequences: The agreement of 
predicted and measured quantities is being displaced by an agreement of calculated and 
experimental images. The latter qualitative agreement consists primarily in the absence, even 
deliberate suppression of visual clues by which to hold calculated and experimental images apart. 
Indeed, the (nano)technoscientific researcher frequently compares two displays or computer 
screens. One display offers a visual interpretation of the data that were obtained through a series of 
measurements (e.g. by an electron or scanning probe microscope), the other presents a dynamic 
simulation of the process he might have been observing – and for this simulation to be readable as 
such, the simulation software produces a visual output that looks like the output for an electron or 
scanning probe microscope. Agreement and disagreement between the two images then allows the 
researchers to draw inferences about probable causal processes and to what extent they have 
understood them. Here, the likeness of the images appears to warrant the inference from the 
mechanism modeled in the simulation to the mechanism that is probably responsible for the data 
that were obtained experimentally. Accordingly (and this cannot be done here) one would need to 
 Here, a case study of Jan Hendrik Schön might show that he was caught between quantitative and 19
qualitative methodologies. He was “caught cheating,” after all, when it was discovered that for different 
experiments he included an exactly identical plot of current-flow. This diagram is supposed to be generated 
from a series of measurements but the characteristic shape of the curve is also a qualitative short-hand 
expression for “current is flowing.” In a culture of research that is moving increasingly to produce effects, 
Schön may well have “written” this diagram as it is generally “read” –  without regard to the particular 
values but as a symbol for a certain type of event. Overall, Schön’s case is less innocent and more 
complicated than this [32]. But perhaps in other regards, too, it is symptomatic of the ambivalence that 
results from the transdisciplinary qualitative orientation of nanotechnoscience even as nanoscale research 
continues to be informed mostly by rigorously quantitative disciplinary traditions.
!11
show how nanoscale researchers construct mutually reinforcing likenesses, how they calibrate not 
only simulations to observations and visual representations physical systems but also their own 
work to that of others, current findings to long-term visions. This kind of study would show that 
unifying theories play little rôle in this, unless the common availability of a large tool-kit of theories 
can be said to unify the research community. Instead of theories, it is instruments (STM, AFM, etc.), 
their associated software, techniques and exemplary artefacts (buckyballs, carbon nanotubes, gold 
nanoshells, molecular wires) that provide relevant common referents [33, 34, 35]. 
(2) “Ontological Indifference”: Representation vs. Substitution 
This is also not the place to subject this qualitative methodology to a sustained critique. Such a 
critique is easy, in fact, from the point of view of rigorous and methodologically self-aware 
quantitative science [31]. Far more interesting is the question why, despite this critique, a qualitative 
approach appears to be good enough for the purposes of nanoscale research. As Peter Galison has 
pointed out, these purposes are not to accurately represent the nanoscale and, in particular, not to 
decide what exists and what doesn’t exist, what is more fundamental and what is derivative. He 
refers to this as the “ontological indifference” of nanotechnoscience [5]. Why is it, then, that 
nanotechnological research can afford this indifference? For example, molecular electronics 
researchers may invoke more or less simplistic pictures of electron transport but they do not need to 
establish the existence of electrons. Indeed, electrons are so familiar to them that they might think 
of them as ordinary macroscopic things that pass through a molecule as if it were another material 
thing with a tunnel going through it [20]. Some physicists and most philosophers of physics 
strongly object to such blatant disregard for the strangely immaterial and probabilistic character of 
the quantum world that is the home of electrons, orbitals, standing electron waves [36, 37]. And 
indeed, to achieve a practical understanding of electron transport, it may be necessary to entertain 
more subtle accounts. However, it is the privilege of ontologically indifferent technoscience that it 
can always develop more complicated accounts as the need arises. For the time being, it can see 
how far it gets with rather more simplistic pictures.  20
 Ontological indifference amounts to a disinterest in questions of representation and an interest, 
 A particularly interesting and challenging example of this is Don Eigler’s famous picture of a quantum 20
corral that confines a standing electron wave. The picture’s seemingly photographic realism suggests that the 
quantum corral is just as thing-like as a macroscopic pond. It brazenly bypasses all discussions regarding the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics and thus displays its ontological indifference. Nevertheless, it is an icon 
of nanotechnoscience, testimony to new capabilities of manipulation and visualization, and a down-payment 
of sorts on the promise that technical control does not stop at the threshold to quantum effects.  
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instead, in substitution.  Instead of using sparse modeling tools to economically represent salient 21
causal features of real systems, nanoresearchers produce in the laboratory and in their models a rich, 
indeed over-saturated substitute reality such that they begin by applying alternative techniques of 
data reduction not to “nature out there” but to some domesticated chunk of reality in the laboratory. 
These data reduction and modeling techniques, in turn, are informed by algorithms which are 
concentrated forms of previously studied real systems, they are tried and true components of 
substitute realities that manage to emulate real physical systems [38].  In other words, there is so 22
much reality in the simulations or constructed experimental systems before them, that 
nanotechnology researchers can take them for reality itself [39]. They study these substitute systems 
and, of course, have with these systems faint prototypes for technical devices or applications. While 
the public is still awaiting significant nanotechnological products to come out of the labs, the 
researchers in the labs are already using nanotechnological tools to detach and manipulate more or 
less self-sufficient nanotechnological systems which “only” require further development before they 
can exist as useful devices outside the laboratory, devices that not only substitute for but improve 
upon something in nature.  
(3) Images as the Beginning and End of Nanotechnologies 
Again, it may have appeared like a cumbersome path that led from qualitative methodology and its 
constructions of likeness to the notion that models of nanoscale phenomena do not represent but 
substitute chunks of reality and that they thereby involve the kind or constructive work that is 
required also for the development of nanotechnological systems and devices. For more immediate 
illustration of this point, we need to consider only the rôle of visualization technologies in the 
 Compare Peter Galison’s suggestion above that the relevant contrast is that between demonstrating 21
existence and building things. Yet, as we will be shown in section 4 below, “building” is too narrow and too 
“technical” a notion. It does not do justice to the intellectual engagement, even passion for the challenges 
encountered at the nanoscale. 
 Rom Harré contrasts scientific instruments that serve as probes into causal processes and modeling 22
apparatus (including simulations) that domesticates or produces phenomena. It is this modeling apparatus 
that underwrites epistemic success in constructions of likeness: Instruments typically obtain measurements 
that can be traced back down a causal chain to some physical state, property, or process. As such, the 
instruments are detached from nature – measurements tell us something about the world. Physical models, in 
contrast, are part of nature and exhibit phenomena such that the relevant causal relations obtain within the 
apparatus and the larger apparatus-world complex. Whether it domesticates a known phenomenon like the 
rainbow or elicits an entity or process that does not occur “naturally,” it does not allow for straightforward 
causal inference to the world within which the apparatus is nested [38]. As the metaphor of domestication 
and Harré’s conception of an apparatus-world complex suggest, causal inference from the apparatus to the 
world may be required only for special theoretical purposes that are characterized by a specific concern for 
reality (for example, when something goes wrong and one wants to explore the reasons for this). At the same 
time, the very fact that the apparatus is nested in the world delivers an (unarticulated) continuity of principles 
and powers and the affordance of ontological indifference.
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history of nanotechnological research.  Many would maintain, after all, that it all began for real 23
when Don Eigler and Erhard Schweizer created an image with the help of 35 xenon atoms. By 
arranging the atoms to spell “IBM” they did not represent a given reality but created an image that 
replaces a random array of atoms by a technically ordered proto-nanosystem. Since then, the ability 
to create images and to spell words has served as a vanguard in attempts to assert technical control 
in the nano-regime – the progress of nanotechnological research cannot be dissociated from the 
development of imaging techniques that are often at the same time techniques for intervention. 
Indeed, Eigler and Schweizer’s image has been considered proof of concept for moving atoms at 
will. It is on exhibit in the STM web-gallery of IBM’s Almaden laboratory and is there quite 
appropriately entitled “The Beginning” – a beginning that anticipates the end or final purpose of 
nanotechnologies, namely to directly and arbitrarily inscribe human intentions on the atomic or 
molecular scale. 
 Images from the nanocosm are at this point (early 2007) still the most impressive as well as 
popular nanotechnological products. By shifting from quantitative coordinations of numerical 
values to the construction of qualitative likeness, from the conventional representation of reality to 
the symbolic substitution of one reality by another, nanotechnosciene has become beholden to the 
power of images. Art historians and theorists like William Mitchell or Hans Belting, in particular, 
have emphasized the difference between conventional signs that serve the purpose of representation 
and pictures or images that embody visions and desires, that cannot be controlled in that they are 
not mere vehicles of information but produce an excess of meaning that is not contained in a 
conventional message [40, 41]. 
 The power of images poses some of the most serious problems of and for nanoscience and 
nanotechnologies. This is readily apparent already for “The Beginning.” As mentioned above, it is 
taken to signify that for the first time in history humans have manipulated atoms at will, and thus as 
proof of concept for the most daring nanotechnological visions and by the most controversial 
nanotechnological visionaries such as Eric Drexler. This was not, of course, what Eigler and 
Schweizer wanted to say. Their image is testimony also to the difficulty, perhaps the limits of 
control of individual atoms. But the power of their image overwhelms any such testimony. 
 Here arises a problem similarly as above in section 1.3. The specificity, complexity, and 
difficulty of work at the nanoscale do not have a language and do not find expression. The theories 
imported from other size regimes can only carve out an unbounded space of unlimited potential, 
 It is no accident that this is perhaps the best-studied and most deeply explored aspect of nanotechnologies.  23
!14
novelty, possibility, and the pictures from the nanocosm show us a world that has already been 
accommodated to our visual expectations and technical practice.  Ontologically indifferent, 24
nanotechnoscience may work with simplistic conceptions of electron transport, and it produces 
simplistic pictures of atoms, molecules, standing electron waves which contradict textbook 
knowledge of these things. For example, it is commonly maintained that nanosized things consist 
only of surface and have no bulk. This is what makes them intellectually and technically interesting. 
But pictures of the nanocosm invariably show objects with very familiar bulk-surface proportions, a 
world that looks perfectly suited for conventional technical constructions. And thus, again, we 
might be facing the predicament of not being told or shown what the limits of nanotechnical 
constructions and control might be. 
 The power of images also holds another problem, however. In the opposition of conventional 
sign and embodied image the totemistic, fetishistic, magical character of pictures comes to the fore. 
To the extent that the image invokes a presence and substitutes for an absence, its kinship to 
voodoo-dolls, for example, becomes apparent. This is not the place to explore the analogy between 
simulations and voodoo-dolls [31], but it should be pointed out that nanotechnologies in a variety of 
ways cultivate a magical relation to technology – and their imagery reinforces this. Indeed, in the 
history of humankind we might have begun with an enchanted and uncanny nature that needed to be 
soothed with prayer to the spirits that dwelled in rocks and trees. Science and technology began as 
we wondered at nature, became aware of our limits of understanding and yet tamed and rationalized 
nature in a piece-meal fashion. Technology represents the extent to which we managed to defeat a 
spirited, enchanted world and subjected it to our control. We technologized nature. Now, however, 
visitors of science museums are invited to marvel at nanotechnologies, to imagine technological 
agency well beyond human thresholds of perception, experience, and imagination, and to pin 
societal hopes for technological innovation not on intellectual understanding but on a substitutive 
emulation that harnesses the self-organizing powers of nature. We thus naturalize technology, 
replace rational control over brute environments by magical dependency on smart environments, 
and we may end up rendering technology just as uncanny as nature used to be with its earth-quakes, 
diseases, thunderstorms [42, 43].  25
 Compare note 13 above.24
 This is a strong indictment not of particular nanotechnologies but of certain ways of propagating our 25
nanotechnological future. Considered another way, it is simply an engineering challenge to design 
nanotechnology for the human scale.
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IV.  FROM DEFINITIONS TO VISIONS  
(1) Wieldly and Unwieldly Conceptions    
The first two sections gave rise to the same complaint. After surveying the rôle of theories and 
methodologies for the construction of technical systems that can substitute for reality, it was noted 
that this tells us nothing about the specificity, complexity, difficulty of control at the nanoscale. The 
nanocosm appears merely as that place from where nanotechnological innovations emanate, and so 
far it appears that it can be described only in vaguely promising term: The domain of interest to 
nanoscience and nanotechnologies is an exotic territory that comprises all that lies in the borderland 
of quantum and classical regimes, all that is unpredictable (but explicable) by available theories and 
all that is scale-dependently discontinuous, complex, full of novelty and surprise.  26
 However, as one attempts a positive definition of nanotechnoscience and its domain of 
phenomena or applications, one quickly learns how much is at stake. In particular, definitions of 
“nanotechnology” can postulate as unified a program so heterogeneous and diverse that we cannot 
intellectually handle or manage the concept anymore. By systematically overtaxing the 
understanding, such definitions leave a credulous public and policy makers in awe and unable to 
engage with “nanotechnology” in a meaningful manner. The search for a conceptually manageable 
definition is thus guided by an interest in specificity but also by a political value – it is to facilitate 
informed engagement on clearly delimited issues. In purely public contexts, therefore, it is best not 
to speak of nanotechnology in the singular at all but only of specific nanotechnologies or 
nanotechnological research programs [44]. In the present context, however, an effort is made to 
circumscribe the scope or domain of nanotechnoscience, that is, to consider the range of phenomena 
that are encountered by nanoscience and nanotechnologies. This proves to be a formidable 
challenge. 
(2) Unlimited Potential 
There is an easy way to turn the negative description of the domain into a positive one. One might 
say that nanoscience and nanotechnologies are concerned with everything molecular or, a bit more 
precisely, with the investigation and manipulation of molecular architecture (as well as the 
properties or functionalities that depend on molecular architecture). 
 Everything that consists of atoms is thus an object of study and a possible design target of 
 Tellingly, the most sophisticated definition of nanoscience is quite deliberate in saying nothing about the 26
“nanocosm” at all. Indeed, this definition is not limited to nanoscale phenomena or effects but intends a more 
general nanoscience of scale-dependently discontinuous behaviors at all scales: Nanoscience is everywhere 
where one encounters a specific kind of novelty or surprise [6].
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nanoscale research. This posits a homogeneous and unbounded space of possibility, giving rise, for 
example, to the notion of an all-powerful nanotechnology as a combinatorial exercise that produces 
the “little BANG” [45] – since bits, atoms, neurons, genes all consist of atoms, since all of them are 
molecular, they all look alike to nanoscientists and engineers who can recombine them at will. And 
thus comes with the notion of an unlimited space of combinatorial possibilities the transgressive 
character of nanotechnoscience: Categorial distinctions of living and inanimate, organic and 
inorganic, biological and technical things, of nature and culture appear to become meaningless. 
Though hardly any scientist believes literally in the infinite plasticity of everything molecular, the 
molecular point of view proves transgressive in many nanotechnological research programs. It is 
particularly apparent where biological cells are redescribed as factories with molecular 
nanomachinery. Aside from challenging cultural sensibilities and systematic attempts to capture the 
special character of living beings and processes, nanotechnoscience here appears naively 
reductionist. In particular, it appears to claim that context holds no sway or, in other words, that 
there is no top-down causation such that properties and functionalities of the physical environment 
partially determine the properties and behaviors of the component molecules.  27
 This sparsely positive and therefore unbounded view of nanoscale objects and their 
combinatorial possibilities thus fuels also the notion of unlimited technical potential along with 
visions of a nanotechnological transgression of traditional boundaries. Accordingly, this conception 
of the domain of nanoscience and nanotechnologies suffers from the problem of unwieldiness – it 
can play no rôle in political discourse other than to appeal to very general predispositions of 
technophobes and technophiles [46]. 
 Three further problems, at least, come with the conception of the domain as “everything 
molecular out there.” And as before, internally scientific problems are intertwined with matters of 
public concern. There is firstly the (by now familiar) ”scientific” and “societal” problem that there 
is no cognizance of limits of understanding and control – as evidenced by a seemingly naive 
reductionism. There is secondly the (by now also familiar) problem that technoscientific 
achievements and conceptions have a surplus of meaning which far exceeds what the research 
community can take responsibility for – the power of images is dwarfed by the power of visions 
(positive or negative) that come with the notion of unlimited potential. And there is finally the 
 I cannot pass judgement on these claims. However, even Richard Jones’s Soft Machines [32] with its vivid 27
appreciation of the complexities of “biological nanotechnology” does not reflect the findings of 
developmental biologists regarding environmental stimuli to gene expression. Recent work on adult stem 
cells appears to reveal that they can be reverted to earlier states but that they nevertheless “remember” what 
they were. Such findings complicate immensely the apparently unbounded promise  that nanotechnology can 
solve all problems at the level of molecules.  
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problem of the relation of technology and nature. 
 Martin Heidegger, one of the sharpest critics of modern technology chastised it for treating all of 
nature as a mere resource that is “standing in reserve” to be harnessed by science and industry [47]. 
The power of his argument derives precisely from the fact that he saw all of modern technoscience 
as one: It is a scaffolding or harness (the German word is Gestell) that recruits humans and nature 
into a universal scheme of production. Rather than accept as a gift what nature, poetry, or craft 
brings forth, it demands the deliverance of what it has learned to rationally expect from the study of 
nature as a calculable system of forces. Conceived as a unified enterprise with an unbounded 
domain of “everything molecular,” nanotechnology fits the bill of such an all-encompassing modern 
technology. It does so because it employs what one might call a thin conception of nature. Nature is 
circumscribed by the physical laws of nature. All that accords with these laws is natural. Thus, 
nanotechnology can quickly and easily claim for itself that it always emulates nature, that it 
manufactures things nanotechnologically just as nature does when it creates living organisms. This 
conception, however, is too “thin” or superficial to be credible and it suffers from the defect that the 
conditions of (human) life on earth have no particular valence in it: From the point of view of 
physics and the eternal immutable laws of nature, life on earth is contingent and not at all necessary. 
The laws predate and will outlive the human species. In contrast, a substantial, richly detailed or 
“thick” conception of nature takes as a norm the special evolved conditions that sustain life on 
earth. Here, any biomimetic research that emulates nature will be characterized by care and respect 
as it seeks to maintain these special conditions. This involves an appreciation of how these 
conditions have evolved historically. On this conception, context holds sway and a molecule that 
occurs in a technical system will not be the same as one in a biological system, even if it had the 
same chemical composition. 
 It is an open question and challenge to nanoscience and nanotechnologies, however, whether it 
can embrace such a thick or substantial conception of nature.  
(3) A Formidalbe Challange 
Just because it is easy to identify at least four major problems with the commonly held view that the 
domain of nanotechnological research encompasses “everything molecular” does not mean that 
there is compelling way to avoid those problems. In particular, it appears to defy common sense and 
the insights of the physical sciences to argue that molecules should have a history or that they 
should be characterized by the specific environments in which they appear. Is it not the very 
accomplishment of physical chemistry ever since Lavoisier that it divested substances of their local 
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origins by considering them only in terms of their composition, in terms of analysis and synthesis 
[48]? And should one not view nanoscience and nanotechnologies as an extension of traditional 
physics, physical chemistry, and molecular biology as they tackle new levels of complexity? All this 
appears evident enough, but yet there are grounds on which to tackle the formidable challenge and 
to differentiate the domain of nanoscientific objects.   28
 As noted above, bulk chemical substances are registered and assessed on the grounds of a 
physico-chemical characterization. Once a substance is approved, it can be used in a variety of 
contexts of production and consumption. On this traditional model, there appears no need to 
consider its variability of interactions in different bio-chemical environments [but see 30]. Though 
the toolkit of nanotoxicology is still being developed, there is a movement afoot according to which 
a carbon nanotube is perhaps not a carbon nanotube.  What it is depends on its specific context of 
use: Dispersed in water or bound in a surface, coated or uncoated, functionalized or not – all this is 
toxicologically relevant. Moreover, a comprehensive physico-chemical characterization that 
includes surface properties, size, and shape would require a highly complex taxonomy with too 
many species of nanoparticles, creating absurdly unmanageable tasks of identification perhaps one 
particle at a time. Instead, the characterization of nanoparticles might proceed by way of the level of 
standardization that is actually reached in production and that is required for integration in a 
particular product – with a smaller or larger degree of variability, error-tolerance, sensitivity to 
environmental conditions, as the case may be for a specific product in its context of use. 
Nanotoxicology would thus be concerned with product safety rather than the safety of component 
substances. On this account the particles would indeed be defined by their history and situation in 
the world, and thus thickly by their place within and their impact upon nature as the specific 
evolved conditions of human life on earth.       29
 There is another, more principled argument for a thickly differentiated account of the objects that 
make up the domain of nanoscience and nanotechnologies. The unbounded domain of “everything 
 One might argue that a definition requiring scale-dependent discontinuities already does offer such a 28
differentiation [6]. This is not the case, however. It is a beginning at best. As shown above, this definition 
excludes certain phenomena and processes from nanoscience and thus claims specificity, but it leaves 
nanotechnology entirely undetermined: Nanoscience tends to certain novel or surprising properties and 
processes, nanotechnology is whatever one can make of these properties and processes. More significantly, 
however, the appearance of scale-dependent novel properties can be claimed rather generically. Not every 
property at the nanoscale is discontinuous in respect to scale. However, for every substance one can claim 
that it may or will have some such properties simply in virtue of the proportion of atoms in the boundary 
layers.  
 Nanotoxicology in particular, nanotechnological research in general might thus become a “Social Science 29
of Nature” [49].
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molecular” includes not only the objects and properties that we now have access to and that we can 
now measure and control. It also includes those objects and properties that one may gain access to 
in the future. This way of thinking is indifferent to the problem of actual technical access also in 
that it does not consider how observational instruments and techniques structure, shape, perhaps 
alter the objects in the domain. On this account, the domain appears open and unlimited because it 
implicitly refers to an imaginary (future) state of a non-intrusive and perfectly perceptive presence 
of observers in the nanoworld. In contrast to this account, the domain could be delimited more 
concretely and its visionary surplus could be contained more effectively if it did not include all 
nanoscale objects “out there” but considers how these objects are constituted, how they become 
accessible to nanoscale research. Accordingly, the domain of objects and processes would consist of 
just those phenomena and effects that are disclosed by scanning tunneling microscopy and other 
specifically nanotechnological procedures [50, see also 51].  
 However, more so than the current attempt to formulate a philosophy of nanotechnoscience, this 
proposal by Peter Janich ascribes to nanotechnoscience a methodological unity or basis in common 
practice. He suggests a philosophical program of systematizing the operations by which nanoscale 
objects become amenable to measurement and observation. Such a systematic reconstruction of the 
domain of objects of nanotechnological research might begin by looking at length measurement or 
scanning probe microscopy. However, research practice is not actually unified in this manner. Even 
scanning probe microscopy – to many a hallmark or point of origin for nanotechnologies – plays a 
minor rôle in the work of many nanoscale researchers [52]. Also, the above-mentioned struggles to 
attain standard measures, to characterize nanomaterials testify to the unruliness of the objects of 
research. They are not constituted through methodical procedures that individuate objects and make 
them comparable throughout the scientific community. Instead, it appears that they are constituted 
through complicated interactions that are difficult to reproduce and that rely on proximate likeness. 
 Since Janich’s approach faces considerable odds, all one can do perhaps is to generalize the 
previous lesson from nanotoxicology: The objects of nanoscale research are constituted through 
their specific histories – histories that concern their origin (in a tissue sample, in the earth, in a 
chemically produced batch), that include nanotechnological interventions as well as their location 
finally in a technical system. This would promote, of course, the fragmentation of 
“nanotechnology” into as many “nanotechnologies” as there are nanotechnological devices or 
applications. A nightmare vision for some, this may be an ineluctable prospect for others. If this is 
so, it becomes impossible to uphold the idea of carbon nanotubes as all-purpose technical 
components. If they contribute to the performance of some product, then they are individuated or 
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characterized as being carbon-nanotubes-in-that-product, and they are as safe or unsafe as that 
product is. By the same token, they are no longer conceived as molecular objects that are 
combinable in principle with just about any other. The open space of unlimited potential 
differentiates into a manifold of specific technological trajectories. 
 The formidable challenge has not been met by this proposal. It does help dramatize, however, 
the inherent tension in the commonly held view of nanotechnological objects, as well as the 
difficulties (once again) of prediction and control at the nanoscale. 
V.  FROM EPISTEMIC CERTAINTY TO SYSTEMIC ROBUSTNESS 
(1) What do Nanoscientists Know 
The previous sections considered research practices of nanotechnosciences – how theories are 
stretched to the complexities at the nanoscale, how a qualitative methodology serves the 
construction of likeness and inferences from that likeness, how the research objects are individuated 
and encountered. All these practices contribute to the generation of knowledge but it remains to be 
explored in which sense this is “objective knowledge.” As in traditional science, the findings of 
nanotechnoscientific research are published in scientific journals, so the questions is, more 
concretely, what kind of knowledge is expressed or communicated in a nanoscientific journal 
article. To answer this question properly, contrasts need to be established and particular publications 
compared. Here, a summary must suffice. 
 A typical research article of classical science states a hypothesis, offers an account of the 
methods, looks at the evidence produced, and assesses the hypothesis in light of the evidence. It 
participates in a public process of evaluating propositions, of finding certain beliefs or statements 
true or false, and of seeking certainty even where it is impossible to attain. In contrast, a 
technoscientific research article provides testimony to an acquired capability. It offers a sign or 
proof of what has been accomplished in the laboratory and tells a story of what has been done. The 
telling of the story does not actually teach the capability but it offers a challenge to the reader that 
they might develop this capability themselves. As opposed to epistemic knowledge (concerned with 
truth or falsity of propositions), nanoscale research produces skill knowledge. This is not an 
individualized skill, however, or tacit knowledge. Acquired capabilities can be objective and public, 
specifically scientific, and communicable. They grasp causal relations, and establish habits of 
action. They are assessed or validated not by the application of criteria or norms but by being 
properly entrenched in a culture of practice. One cannot judge their truth or falsity (skills aren’t true 
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or false) but by the robustness of demonstrability: If one has acquired a capability, one can more or 
less consistently do something in the context of an “apparatus-world complex” [38]. As opposed to 
the truth or falsity, certainty or uncertainty of hypotheses, the hallmarks of technoscientific 
knowledge are robustness, reliability, resilience of technical systems or systematic action.   
  
(2) The Knowledge Society 
This account of skill knowledge presses the question of where the “science” is in “technoscience.” 
The answer to this question can be found in the very first section of this article: It is in the (closed) 
theories that are brought as tools to the achievement of partial control and partial understanding. 
Nanotechnoscience seeks not to improve theory or to change our understanding of the world but 
merely to manage complexity and novelty. As such, nanotechnoscience is just technical tinkering, 
just product development, just an attempt to design solutions to societal problems or to shape and 
reshape the world. However, the conceptual and physical tools it tinkers with do not come from 
ordinary experience, from common sense and a craft tradition but concentrate within them the 
labors of science. So, the “science” of “nanotechnoscience” is what goes into it. What comes out is 
skill knowledge and it does not rely on a corresponding scientific understanding. As long as one can 
produce an effect in a reasonably robust manner, it does not really matter whether scientific 
understanding catches up. Indeed, the complexities may be such that it cannot fully catch up.  30
 The standard example of technology being ahead of science is the steam engine which was 
developed without a proper understanding of the relation between heat and work [53]. This 
understanding came much later and, indeed, was prompted by the efficient performance of the 
steam engine. The steam engine itself was therefore not applied science but the result of technical 
tinkering. It was made of valves, pumps, gears etc. of which there was good non-scientific craft-
knowledge – and it worked just fine before the advent of thermodynamics. In a sense, it didn’t need 
to be understood. 
 As opposed to the steam engine, nanotechnological devices (whatever they may be), genetically 
modified organisms, drug delivery systems are offsprings of the knowledge society. They are not 
made of valves and pumps but assembled from highly “scientized” components such as algorithms, 
capabilities acquired by scientifically trained researchers, measuring and monitoring devices with 
 This diagnosis is not entirely novel or surprising. Technology, writes Heidegger, is always ahead of 30
science and, in a deep sense, science is only applied technology [47]. By this he means not only that 
laboratory science requires instruments and experimental apparatus for stabilizing the phenomena. He means 
more generally that a technological attitude informs the scientific way of summoning phenomena to 
predictably appear once certain initial conditions are met.
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plenty of knowledge built in [39]. The science that goes into the components is well-understood, not 
so the interactions of all the components and their sensitivities in the context of the overall technical 
system. Still, like the steam-engine it may work just fine without being fully understood. And 
though one cannot attain  positive knowledge from which to derive or predict its performance, we 
may learn to assess its robustness. 
(3) Social Robustness 
The shift from hypotheses that take the form of sentences to actions within techno-cultural systems, 
from epistemic questions of certainty to systemic probes of robustness has implications also for the 
“risk society” that looks to government mostly for protection from risk [54].   31
 Expectations of certainty and assurances of safety will not be met by nanotechnologies. Other 
technologies already fail to meet them. Certainty about the safety of a new drug, for example, is 
produced by the traditional method of a clinical trial that  establishes or refutes some proposition 
about the drug’s efficacy and severity of side-effects. A far more complex and integrated mechanism 
is required where such certainty is unattainable and where robustness needs to be demonstrated. 
Here, several activities have to work in tandem, ranging from traditional toxicology, occupational 
health, and epidemiology all the way to the deliberate adoption of an unknown risk for the sake of a 
significant desired benefit. If this integration works, social robustness will be built into the technical 
system along with the robustness of acquired skills, tried and true algorithms, measuring and 
monitoring apparatus. The fact that nanoscale researchers demonstrate acquired capabilities and that 
they thus produce “mere” skill knowledge, creates a demand for skill knowledge also in a social 
arena where nanotechnological innovations are challenged, justified, and appropriated. 
   
VI.  WHAT BASIC SCIENCE DOES NANOTECHNOLOGY NEED? 
The preceding sections provided a survey of nanotechnoscience in terms of disciplinary questions (a 
complex field partially disclosed by stretching closed theories), of methodology (constructions and 
qualitative judgments of likeness), of ontology (a thin conception of nature as unlimited potential), 
and of epistemology (acquisition and demonstration of capabilities). This does not exhaust a 
philosophical characterization of the field which would have to include, for example, a sustained 
 The precautionary principle refers to the certainty and uncertainty of knowledge regarding risks. Where 31
technology assessment shifts from truth of sentences about risk to the robustness or resilience of emerging 
technical systems and their interaction with other technical systems, the precautionary principle is not 
applicable and a different kind of prudential approach is required – for example, Dupuy and Grinbaum’s 
“ongoing normative assessment” [55].
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investigation of nanotechnology as a conquest of space or a kind of territorial expansion.  Also, 32
nothing has been said so far about nanotechnology as an enabling technology that might enable, in 
particular, a convergence with bio- and information-technologies. Finally, it might be important to 
consider nanotechnoscience as an element or symptom of a larger cultural transition from scientific 
to technoscientific research. 
 This survey is limited in other ways. It glossed over the heterogeneity of research questions and 
research traditions. And it focused exclusively on the way in which nanotechnological research has 
developed thus far. There is nothing in the preceding account to preclude profound reorientations of 
nanoscience and nanotechnologies. Indeed, one reorientation might consist in the whole enterprise 
breaking apart and continuing in rather more traditional disciplinary settings – with “nano” ceasing 
to be a funding umbrella but becoming a prefix that designates a certain approach. Thus, under the 
sectoral funding umbrellas “food and agriculture,” “energy,” “health,” “manufacturing,” or 
“environment” researchers with the “nano”-prefix would investigate how problems and solutions 
can be viewed at the molecular level. Their work would then have to be integrated into more 
comprehensive approaches to the problem at hand. 
 Alternatively, nanotechnological researchers may pursue and promote disciplinary consolidation 
and unification.  In that case, they might be asking the question “what kind of basic science does 33
nanotechnology need?” From quantum mechanics, hydrodynamics, etc. derive the (closed) theories 
that serve as the toolkit on which nanoscale research is drawing. While these are basic sciences, of 
course, they are not therefore the basis of nanoscience. What, then, is the basic scientific research 
that needs to be done in order to properly ground nanotechnologies or to establish nanoscience as a 
field in its own right? There are no attempts so far to address this question in a systematic way.  34
And obviously, one should not expect any consensus regarding the following list of proposed basic 
research for nanotechnology. 
 In terms of empirical grounding or a theoretical paradigm, some call for general theories of 
(supra-)molecular structure-properties relations, others imagine that there will be a future science of 
 One implication of this is that nanotechnology should not be judged as the promise of a future but, instead, 32
as a collective experiment in and with the present [56].
 The field of “nanomedicine” appears to be moving in that direction by distinguishing its research 33
questions and paradigms from “medical nanotechnologies.” It is not at all clear yet whether nanomedicine 
will emerge from this with a disciplinary identity of its own, including perhaps a unique body of theory.
 To be sure, there are piecemeal approaches. One might say, for example, that a theory of electron transport 34
is emerging as a necessary prerequisite for molecular electronics (but see [57]). Also, the giant 
magnetoresistance effect might be considered a novel nanotechnological phenomenon that prompted “basic” 
theory development [13].
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molecular and nanotechnical self-organization.  Following the suggestion of Peter Janich (see 35
above, section 3.2), one might identify and systematize how nanoscale phenomena are constituted 
through techniques of observation and measurement – this might render theories of instrumentation 
basic to nanoscience.  36
 Another kind of basic research, entirely, would come from so-called Bildwissenschaft (image or 
picture-science) that could provide a foundation for image-production and visualization practice in 
nanotechnoscience. Such investigations might contribute visual clues for distinguishing illustrations 
from animations, from simulations, from visualizations of microscopically obtained data. It might 
also investigate image-text relations or develop conventions for reducing the photographic 
intimations of realism while enhancing informational content.  37
 Finally, one might ask, whether nanotechnoscience can and should be construed as a “social 
science of nature.”  As an enabling, general purpose, or key technology it leaves undetermined 38
what kinds of applications will be enabled by it. This sets it apart from cancer research, the 
Manhattan project, the arms race, space exploration, artificial intelligence research, etc. As long as 
nanotechnoscience has no societal mandate other than to promote innovation, broadly conceived, it 
remains essentially incomplete, requring social imagination and public policy to create an 
intelligent demand for the capabilities it can supply. As research is organized to converge upon 
particular societal goals [61], nanoscience and nanotechnology might be completed by 
incorporating social scientists, anthropologists, philosophers in its ambitions to design or shape a 
 See, for example, [15]. In [14] Michael Roukes calls for the identification of the special laws that govern 35
the nanoscale. To be sure, there is profound skepticism in the scientific community a) that there can be laws 
of structure-property relations at the nanoscale, and b) that they are needed in order to pursue 
nanotechnological research. On this latter view, the account provided in the first four sections of this paper 
provides quite sufficient “grounding” of nanotechnology.
 See, for example, [58] on modeling of measurements at the nanoscale. Can this kind of theory 36
development and modification serve to constitute a nanoscale research community – or does it belong to a 
special tribe of instrument developers that merely enters into a trade with other nanotechnology researchers 
[59]?
 Compare the suggestion by Thomas Staley (at the conference Imaging Nanospace) that visualizations of 37
data could be constructed like maps with graphic elements even text imposed upon the quasi-photographic 
image [60]. This might break the animistic spell of the powerful image (see above) and restrict the image to 
the scientific community.
 See notes 3 and 22 above. The term Soziale Naturwissenschaft was coined in the context of the finalization 38
thesis and could be designated more literally as a social natural science – science of a nature that is socially 
shaped through applied science, technology and human action. It is thus not social science but an integrated 
approach that acknowledges the social character of the world. Here, this proposal is taken up in two ways. 
Materials (as opposed to matter) and molecules defined by their history and situation are social entities, as 
such objects of this socials science of nature. Secondly, nanotechnoscience is a program for shaping and 
reshaping, designing and redesigning, for reforming the world. To the extent that this is also a social reform 
it is systematically incomplete without societal agenda-setting: What are the projects, the problems to be 
solved, the targets and design norms of nanotechnoscience?
!25
world atom by atom. 
 Nanotechnologies are frequently touted for their transformative potential, for bringing about the 
next scientific revolution. This paper did not survey a revolutionary development, but pragmatic 
and problematic integrations of pre-existing scientific knowledge with the novel discoveries at the 
nanoscale. If one expects science to be critical of received theories and to produce a better 
understanding of the world, if one expect technology to enhance transparency and control by 
disenchanting and rationalizing nature, these pragmatic integrations appear regressive rather than 
revolutionary. Once one makes the shift from epistemic certainty to systemic robustness, these 
pragmatic integrations hold the promise of producing socially robust technologies. In the meantime, 
there is little incentive and no movement to seriously consider the question of a disciplinary 
reorientation and consolidation of the nanosciences and nanotechnologies. A nanotechnological 
revolution has not happened yet, we may be waiting for in vain, and this is probably a good thing.  39
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